2003-01 Firm Property Rights, Bargaining, and Internalization by Abrego, Lisandro & Whalley, John
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Department of Economics Research Reports Economics Working Papers Archive
2003
2003-01 Firm Property Rights, Bargaining, and
Internalization
Lisandro Abrego
John Whalley
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsresrpt
Part of the Economics Commons
Citation of this paper:
Abrego, Lisandro, John Whalley. "2003-01 Firm Property Rights, Bargaining, and Internalization." Department of Economics Research
Reports, 2003-1. London, ON: Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario (2003).
 1 
Firm Property Rights, Bargaining, and Internalization 
 
Lisandro Abrego+ 
International Monetary Fund 
 
John Whalley 
Universities of Warwick and Western Ontario  
and NBER 
 
Abstract 
 
Coase’s seminal 1960 paper on externalities is associated with the so-called Coase 
Theorem which is stated in the literature in many forms.  However, its main thrust was less to 
state a theorem than to challenge Pigou’s earlier insistence on the need for government 
intervention through Pigouvian taxes to achieve internalisation of externalities. Coase argued 
instead that private party bargaining can be relied upon to internalise externalities, but equally 
insisted that establishing clear and firm property rights is a precondition to successful 
internalisation achieving bargaining. Similar thinking has lead to clear definitions of property 
rights becoming a key part of World Bank conditionality in the environmental area. 
This paper discusses the underpinnings of this position, arguing that it is little researched 
and subject to challenge. We first show how Coase only considered one type of property right, 
and where others such as compensation rights are allowed for the property right assignment will 
itself directly achieve internalisation with no need for further bargaining. We also show how 
ambiguous property rights can dominate a clear assignment of property rights for a case where 
recipients of damage can move to avoid damage, but must remain and actually receive damage in 
order to be recipients of compensation. Rights to either polluters to pollute, or to recipients of 
damage to compensation create a distortion; and either outcome is dominated by no assignment 
of property rights, but a tax on polluters (Pigouvian tax) with revenues redistributed equally to 
the whole population. 
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I. Introduction 
Economists generally seem to think that establishing firm property rights is a 
precondition for efficient resource allocation in the presence of externalities. Property rights are 
seen as necessary for Coasian bargaining to occur, which, in turn, will achieve internalisation 
(Pareto efficiency). Myles (1995) in a recent graduate public finance text, for instance, (p. 323), 
argues that “… the clarification of property rights should constitute the first step in the 
construction of a policy towards externalities”. The World Bank frequently argues a similar case 
for dealing with environmental externalities in developing countries (World Development Report 
1992). The literature on international environmental externalities which produced the polluter 
pays principle (OECD (1977)) sees the absence of property rights as a fundamental impediment 
to achieving internalisation and hence Pareto-efficient outcomes.  
At the time, the main point of Coase’s (1960) paper was that government intervention 
through taxes and subsidies as argued for by Pigou (1924) was not necessary to internalise 
externalities.1 Bargaining between the private parties to the externality could yield the same 
outcome with no government intervention. But for this to occur clear property rights needed to 
be established first. Coase saw the assignment of such rights as being arbitrary from an economic 
point of view because externalities are inevitably reciprocal in nature and founded mainly on 
appeals to natural justice. But once established they lead to efficient outcomes through 
bargaining.2  
                                                 
1The problems created by non-convexities in the presence of externalities (see Starrett, 1972) also later cast doubt 
on whether market guided mechanisms (such as a Pigouvian tax) can satisfactorily achieve internalisation, adding 
further impetus to the search for clear property rights which allow bargaining to take place. 
2 He advanced other propositions, such as the claim that the outcome of such bargaining was independent of the 
assignment of property rights, which Dolbear (1967), Huwicz (1995) and others later showed to be false. 
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The purpose of this paper is to argue that existing literature discussion of property rights 
and internalisation needs to be more nuanced than simply repeating Coase’s conditions. We first 
show that despite Coase’s arguments in favour of clear property rights as a precondition for 
bargaining, bargaining may not be needed if a wider array of potential property rights beyond 
those considered by Coase are available. Coase only considered rights to be either free of or to 
inflict damage, in effect court rulings on injunctions; not compensation rights for damage 
actually inflicted. However, compensation rights as embodied in the OECD’s polluter pays 
principle will automatically internalise externalities, without the need to resort to bargaining as 
in Coase. The argument that firm property rights are needed to generate efficient outcomes via 
bargaining is thus weakened if some types of property rights can achieve this directly without 
bargaining. 
We argue that in the presence of behavioural responses to the damage accompanying 
external effects, the establishment of firm property rights need not always be a good thing. We 
appeal to cases where recipients of damage can move to avoid or abate damage, and property 
rights established in their favour can cause them to remain in a heavier damage location and 
receive more damage. Compared to the case where no bargaining occurs, granting such rights 
may make things worse. 
The structure of the paper is to first discuss Coasian bargaining and property rights. We 
note that nowhere in Coase, or the literature that follows, is there any discussion of the efficiency 
implications of property right assignments and whether the way these are assigned can 
themselves generate inefficiencies though induced behavioural responses; i.e. whether firm 
property rights are necessarily a good thing. The next section discusses compensation rights, the 
polluter or victim pays principles, bargaining and efficiency. We then discuss the establishment 
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of property rights in a case where there is locational mobility, and present an example where 
establishing firm property rights is Pareto worsening. These two main sections of the paper serve 
to emphasize the themes that bargaining may not be needed to achieve efficiency under some 
property rights schemes, and that firm property right allocation are not always desirable on 
efficiency grounds. 
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II. Coase, Property Rights, Bargaining and Externalities 
In his 1960 paper Coase argued that in the presence of externalities and assuming away 
transactions costs, the establishment of clear property rights would allow for bargaining between 
private parties to take place which would lead to the full correction of externalities and the 
restoration of Pareto optimality. Since then, the idea that well-defined property rights are a 
precondition for achieving economic efficiency in the presence of externalities seems to have 
been accepted without any serious challenge by both academic and policy-oriented economists.  
Coase’s paper was written as a critique of Pigou (1924) which argued that government 
intervention through taxes on the economic activities responsible for externalities was the way to 
restore Pareto efficiency. Coase’s argument was that with clearly defined property rights and 
bargaining Pigouvian taxes, and hence government intervention, were unnecessary. Coase 
argued that since externalities were reciprocal, the assignment of property rights was to a large 
degree arbitrary; but their assignment was a necessary precondition to bargaining achieving 
Pareto optimality. If victims of damage had the property rights to be free of damage, they would 
accept some amount of compensation for allowing damage generating economic activity to 
proceed. If inflictors of damage had the property rights, victims of damage would bribe them to 
restrain their damage generating activities. In either case, all the relevant marginal conditions for 
efficiency and optimality would be satisfied and Pareto optimality would be restored. As 
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) later argued, Pigouvian taxes under this view of the world 
could be even harmful on efficiency grounds if they were introduced after bargaining had 
successfully internalised the externality at issue.  
The verbal style of Coase’s paper has, over the years, given rise to more than one version 
of the theorem (e.g. Cooter, 1989; Stigler, 1989; Coase, 1992; Hurwicz, 1995). Coase’s central 
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proposition that the allocation of resources is independent of the legal assignment of rights has 
been shown to be false (Dolbear, 1967; Hurwicz, 1995; Hurwicz, 1999; Shapiro, 1974; Editors, 
1977).3   Coase’s various propositions on property rights and bargaining for externality 
correction are often referred to as “the Coase Theorem”, although Coase’s original statement was 
not in the form of a theorem as such. Instead, he put forward a set of ideas and illustrations as to 
how, in the presence of an externality, a clear definition of property rights will allow private 
bargaining to take place, and lead to an efficient outcome without the need for government 
intervention.  Over the years details of Coase’s analysis have been criticized on various points of 
detail, but the idea that firm property rights are needed for internalisation of externalities has not 
to our knowledge been questioned. The same is true of Coase’s critique of Pigouvian taxation 
that if it is at best unnecessary and at worst efficiency worsening.  In the policy community, for 
instance, institutions such as the World Bank have actively campaigned in favour of clear 
property rights as the necessary first step towards efficient externality treatment in developing 
countries (REF.) 
As presented in Cooter (1989), the central element of the Coase theorem is the assertion 
that, in the absence of transaction costs, the legal assignment of property rights is irrelevant for 
the allocation of resources, since this will be modified by individuals through market 
transactions. With zero transaction costs, “all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that the 
rights of the various parties should be well-defined…” (Coase, 1960, p.119). Market transactions 
will guarantee efficient resource allocation regardless of the legal assignment of property rights, 
and with firm property rights in place there is no need for Pigouvian taxes. 
                                                 
3 Also see Starrett (1972) and Hurwicz  (1999). 
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Other versions of the Coase theorem cite its statement that with clear property rights, 
bargaining among interested parties (both recipients and inflictors of damage) will lead to Pareto 
optimal outcomes. The bargaining set defines these allocations at which both parties can be 
made better off; all that is needed is to define reservation utilities and supporting property rights 
to achieve this. Coase conceived of such rights in terms of rights to the recipients of damage to 
be guaranteed utility levels free of any disutility associated with damage, or to the inflictors of 
damage having rights to demand compensation in order to reduce the level of damage inflicted. 
He did not consider other forms of rights, such as the more common legal right to be 
compensated for actual damage, or to be subject to damages via litigation and suit. The Coasian 
property right concept was that either the presence or absence of an injunction from the courts to 
enforce restraint of damage at any level. 
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III. Internalisation through Compensation Rights (Polluter-pays Principle) 
As we note above, the discussion both in Coase and in the literature that has followed has 
been about property rights and their role in internalising externalities defining rights in terms of 
minimum utility levels; the utility level of recipients of damage associated with no damage, on 
the one hand, and the utility level of damage inflictors associated with unfettered rights to inflict 
damage, on the other. No attention has been given in the economics literature to other forms of 
property rights, such as the right to sue for damages, as against an injunction to desist as in 
Coase. This is even though rights to damages are what is typically at stake in actual court cases. 
The right to sue for damages actually inflicted we refer to as a compensation right, in contrast to 
a Coasian right. 
A feature of this set of property rights is that in the case of compensation rights (as 
against an injunction), rights awarded in favour of those who actually receive damage associated 
with externalities will automatically internalise them. In contrast to the situation with Coasian 
rights, no additional bargaining will be needed to internalise the externality and achieve Pareto 
optimality. 
That this is so can be seen as follows. We consider a case where damage is utility based 
and recipients of damage have a separable utility function of the form 
 )()( RRR DVGUU −=  (1) 
where RU  is the utility level of recipients of damage, RG  is consumption of goods by recipients 
of damage, and RD  is damage received by damage recipients. We consider a single good, whose 
production is at constant marginal cost 
 GGC λ=)(  (2) 
Damage associated with the production of goods is fixed coefficient 
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 GD β=  (3) 
and is all received by the damage recipients. 
With no compensation rights, producers equate the market price of G to its marginal 
production cost 
 λ=GP  (4) 
and fail to internalise the utility based externality associated with ( )RDV  in (1). 
However, with compensation rights awarded to the recipients of damage, then costs to 
producers also indicate the marginal dissecting of damage ( )( )RDV 1  since this must be paid as 
compensation to damage recipients. This implies that 
 )(' RG DVP += λ  (5) 
and in this case Pareto optimality is fully restored by the assignment of property rights without 
any resort to Coasian bargaining.  
This case also corresponds to the application of the polluter pays principle. This was 
originally suggested by the OECD (1973) as a mechanism for resolving international externality 
conflicts, but with no claims offered for its efficiency properties. However, if the victim pays 
principle is followed instead, no internalisation occurs; and without added bargaining no move 
towards Pareto optimality will occur. 
The point, however, is that if a wider set of property rights are considered as instruments 
to achieve internalisation than those discussed by Coase, then the choice of property right form 
becomes an instrument which can be used to internalise externalities. And compensation rights 
paid to recipients of damage by those who inflict damage will automatically internalise 
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externalities without any recourse to bargaining, while Coasian rights require additional 
bargaining. 
 11 
IV. Internalisation and property rights in the presence of locational choice 
In nearly all the cases that Coase  (1960) discusses it is implicitly assumed that there is 
no locational choice in that neither the party causing the damage nor the victim can move to a 
different location in response to the externality; although this case is touched on in a two 
paragraph discussion at the end of the paper. As a result, different property right assignments 
only have income distribution implications. An immobility assumption, of course, is extreme. 
For example, fishers on a river can move upstream in response to pollution that reduces 
downstream stocks; and individuals living close to a busy airport can move away to avoid noise.  
Once the possibility of locational choice in response to damage is taken into 
consideration, achieving appropriate internalisation through Coasian deals becomes more 
complicated; to the point that it is unclear whether establishing firm property rights in a Coasian 
sense is always a good thing. If polluters are liable for damage and must pay compensation, 
victims have an incentive to remain in the polluted area to receive compensation. This distorts 
migration decisions, with too many people remaining in the damage-ridden area. Bargaining 
deals struck between polluters and victims will address the damage component of the externality, 
but will not be able to correct for the migration distortion. Thus, well-defined property rights 
which allow for bargaining to take place need not restore Pareto optimality. In contrast, a 
Pigouvian tax set equal to the difference between marginal and social cost will be able to achieve 
full internalization sinceprovided that the revenues are distributed across regions in a equal per 
capita lump-sum fashionit will not distort migration decisions.  
We can show this in a simple model which we can solve numerically to evaluate different 
tax and bargaining solutions. 
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 We assume there are two region, A and B, and two goods, E and F. Good E is produced 
only in region A, and generates a negative externality which only affects consumers residing in 
that region. Production of F takes place in both regions, and is assumed not to generate any 
externality. Residents of region B are thus damage-free.  
 
Production and Damage 
 For simplicity, we assume that each good is produced using a single factor (labour) and 
under conditions of decreasing returns to scale. Denoting goods by i and regions by j, we write 
the production of goods as 
 Y Li
j
i
j i
j= ( )α ;      10 << jiα ;  i=E, F;  j = A, B (6) 
where jiY  denotes outputs and 
j
iL  represents labour inputs. The exponents 
j
iα  are strictly less 
than one in the production of each good in each region, and define the elasticity of output with 
respect to the labour input jiL .  The assumption that good E is only produced in region A implies 
that YEB = LEB = 0.   
We assume that damage from the production of good E in region A affects residents in 
region A, lowering their utility. We assume a fixed coefficient damage function, with damage 
given by   
 AE
A YD  β=  (7) 
where AD  denotes damage in region A, and β is the damage per unit of production of good E in 
that region. By assumption, BD  = 0.  
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Preferences 
Preferences are defined over consumption of goods in each region and damage if 
residents in a region receive damage. We assume that there are three types of consumers in the 
economy, all having the same preferences. Polluters, p, or owners of firms producing good E in 
region A receive the return to the fixed factor used in production of E in A. Victims, v, are 
labourers who are resident in region A, while residents in region B, n, receive no damage.  As the 
owners of a fixed factor used in A polluters who reside there are assumed not to be affected by 
the damage they generate, and hence not to move across regions. Labourers have the option to 
move freely across the two regions but victims locate in region A only. Utility functions for 
agents types are given as 
 )( pi
pp CUU =  (8) 
 ),( Avi
vv DCUU =  (9) 
 )( ni
nn CUU =  (10) 
where Up, Uv and Un denote utility for each consumer type (producers, victims, unaffected). Cip, 
Civ and Cin represent the corresponding agents goods consumption, and DA is damage from 
production of good A. In the special case where (4) can be written in separable form we have 
 )()(ˆ Avi
vv DVCUU −=  (11) 
where vUˆ  is utility from goods consumption in the absence of damage, and ( )ADV  is damage in 
utility terms. We assume all labour locating in region A is equally affected by the same damage, 
i.e. ( )ADV  is the damage per labourer locating in A. 
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Equilibrium 
In this model equilibrium involves goods and labour market clearing conditions, with 
goods prices and the wage rate by region endogenously determined. Consumers in each region 
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, but because of interregional mobility 
possibilities, equilibrium also involves an equal utility condition across regions. Thus, with 
identical goods prices across regions, interregional differences in wage rates are offset by the 
marginal value of damage for those residing in region A. Assuming that the same damage 
accrues to all individuals who locate in A, migration equilibrium requires 
 B
v
A WDVW =− λ
)(  (12) 
where AW  and BW  are each region’s wage rates, and λ is the marginal utility of income. 
Equilibrium prices for the two goods are given by *EP  and 
*
FP , such that 
 ji
jk
k
k YC ∑∑
==
=
2
1
3
1
       i = A, B;  j = E, F;  k = p, v, n  (13) 
Good F is assumed to be homogeneous and costlessly traded across regions, and hence we also 
allow for interregional trade in good E. Damage only occurs with the production of E, not 
consumption. 
Market clearing for labour implies wage rates in the two regions, BA WW ,  such that  
 LL ji
i j
=∑∑      i = A, B;  j = E, F; (14) 
where L  is the fixed endowment of labour in the economy.  
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Compensation Rights, Internalisation and Pigouvian Taxes 
For this economy, we consider alternative property right arrangements as instruments to 
facilitate internalisation of externalities. We first consider the case where compensation rights 
are established rather than Coasian property rights, and no bargaining is considered in this case. 
We return later to Coasian property rights. 
If we require compensation rights to be paid by those inflicting damage to those who 
suffer damage then the production externality is internalised, since producers respond to 
( )
λ
A
E
DVP −  as their effective output price. However in this case, the migration equilibrium 
condition (12) reflects the payment of compensation for damage, and becomes 
 BA WW =   (15) 
and inefficiency results since too many individuals now reside in A. 
In turn, if we allow for inflictor rights the efficiency condition for migration (equation 
(7)) is satisfied, but the externality is not internalised. 
If however, a Pigouvian tax is used to correct the externality with a tax, τ, on the output 
of the polluting industry, YAE, this produces the required internalisation result. Here, in order not 
to distort migration decisions, tax revenue must be distributed in a lump-sum fashion across all 
individuals in an equal per capita manner, i.e. such that consumer receive the same amount of tax 
revenue regardless of where they reside. In this case, the income for each consumer is given by 
 Τ+−= EAAEAEp LWYPI  (16) 
 TYPLWI DADE
AAv ++=  (17) 
 TYPI DBD
n +=  (18) 
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where T per capita tax revenue in the whole economy, which is, in turn, given by 
 LYPT EAE /τ=  (19) 
In this case, full internalisation occurs with a restoration of Pareto efficiency but without 
any formal assignment of property rights. Seemingly, an ambiguous or null assignment of 
property rights combined with an appropriate Pigouvian tax dominates equilibria with clearly 
allocated compensation or damage infliction rights. 
 
Bargaining and Coasian Property Rights 
We can also evaluate outcomes in this structure under a Coasian assignment of property 
rights and bargaining using an explicit bargaining model. Here we model bargaining between 
polluters and victims using a Nash bargaining function (Nash, 1950). This approach to 
bargaining has been widely used in the literature, although other formulations such as those due 
to Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) could be used. We assume that bargaining only involves 
polluters and victims, although with mobility those who actually receive damage will be 
endogenously determined. We can write the bargaining problem as the maximization of a Nash 
bargaining criterion function  
 )1()()(max δδ −−−=Ω vvpp UUUU ,       0 < δ < 1   (20) 
subject to the set of feasible allocations lying above some threat point or set of reservation 
utilities. In this formulation Up and Uv are reservation utilities for polluters and victims, and δ is 
a parameter reflecting polluters’ bargaining strength.  
In this set up, the interests of polluters coincide with those of the owners of the fixed 
factor in region A’s polluting industry, E, and the reservation utility for each party depends upon 
the liability rule prevailing. We assume that polluters must bribe victims in order for damage to 
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occur. Coase’s formulation implies that the disagreement point for the parties under this property 
right arrangement is one where polluters are not allowed to inflict any damage without the 
agreement of victims (an injunction being in place against them requiring agreement from 
victims for any damage inflicted). In the present model, this corresponds to a scenario where 
victims are guaranteed their utility level from goods consumption alone (ignoring the disutility 
of damage) in any bargained outcome.  
Denoting by R the amount of compensation that polluters must pay for damage inflicted, 
R is determined through bargaining. Since only wage earners in A are affected by damage and 
hence take part in bargaining, residents in B receive no compensation. Consumers’ incomes in 
this case then become 
 RLWYPI EAAEAE
p −−=  (21) 
 RYPLWI DADE
AAv ++=  (22) 
 DBD
n YPI =  (23) 
Analytical results on the outcome under bargaining are not possible in this structure, and 
numerical simulation must be used; to which we turn next. However, since only one variable, the 
level of output E in A (and hence damage) is the subject of bargaining, and two distortions are 
present, the production externality and the migration condition, bargaining over one object seems 
unlikely to be able to achieve full internalisation.   
Table 1 presents the parameters for a simple economy with CES preferences for polluters 
and damage receivers which we use to provide an example of how bargaining is dominated by a 
Pigouvian tax in this case.  We also specify output elasticities with respect to labour in each 
region, a damage coefficient, B, and have arbitrarily set the relative strength in bargaining to 0.5 
for each of the two groups of polluters and damage receivers. 
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Table 1 
Parameter Values Used for an Artificial Economy 
In Which Ambiguous Property Right Assignments Dominate 
Firm Property Rights 
 
Output elasticity with respect to labour  
• Good E, region A 0.67 
• Good F, region A 0.73 
• Good F, region B 0.83 
  
Shares in preferences  
• Polluters  
o Good E 0.40 
o Good F 0.60 
• Damage receivers  
o Good E 0.40 
o Good F 0.60 
  
Elasticity of substitution in preferences  
• Polluters 1.25 
• Damage receivers 1.25 
  
Damage coefficient (β) 0.03 
  
Relative strength in bargaining  
• Polluters 0.50 
• Damage receivers 0.50 
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Table 2 
 
Outcome in Artificial Economy under Coasian Bargaining and Pigouvian Tax   
Scheme Achieving Full Internalization 
 
 Competitiv
e Case* 
Bargaining 
Outcome with 
rights to damage 
receivers  
Pigouvian Tax Scheme 
with Transfers to 
Provide Constant 
Utility for Polluters 
Utility    
• Polluters 38.42 34.13 34.13 
• Damage receivers 342.82 350.45 350.60 
    
Social welfare change* 0.00 0.89 .93 
    
Labour demand    
• Dirty good     
o Region A 20.00 17.42 17.35 
• Clean good    
o Region A 25.00 34.84 34.84 
o Region B 25.00 17.74 17.82 
    
Output    
• Dirty good     
o Region A 30.00 27.36 27.28 
• Clean industry    
o Region A 40.00 50.88 50.88 
o Region B 30.00 22.54 22.62 
    
Tax Rate   0.11 
Subsidy Rate   0.09 
 
* Sum of Hicksian EVs (polluters' + damage receivers') 
 
Results from the model in Table 2 show that under Coasian bargaining both polluters 
and damage receivers benefit relative to the disagreement point. Output of the good generating 
damage falls, output of the dirty good in region A where damage is inflicted increases, and 
output in the damage free region falls as internalisation occurs.  The utility of polluters falls and 
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that ofdamage receivers rises.  Under a full internalisation Pigouvian tax scheme with no 
assignment of property rights polluters lose and damage receivers gain, but the social welfare 
gain exceeds that under bargaining.  In this case, assigning property rights and allowing 
bargaining to proceed does not yield first best policy response. 
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V. Conclusion  
This paper raises the seemingly neglected issue of efficiency impacts of alternative 
property rights assignments. It first discusses whether or not property rights mechanisms can be 
used directly as an instrument to achieve internalisation; despite the thrust of the literature since 
Coase that property rights are largely a precondition to bargaining, which in turn achieves Pareto 
Optimality. It draws a distinction between rights of victims to be free of damage, and rights of 
damage inflictors to inflict damage; the rights considered by Coase; and rights to sue for 
damages actually inflicted. Under the latter, compensation rights to victims will automatically 
internalise the externalities with no need for bargaining.  It also argues that there are cases, such 
as where behavioural response to damage occurs, where defining property rights and allowing 
for bargaining does not yield first best outcomes and presents an example supporting this 
position. 
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